CLAT PG Current Affairs — 8 July 2026

Section 56 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 prohibits civil arrest of women in execution of a money decree. Enacted over a century ago, it grants blanket immunity to all women regardless of financial capacity. Article 15(3) of the Constitution permits special provisions for women and children. Courts and scholars now question whether this absolute immunity is constitutionally sound, discriminatory against male judgment-debtors, or an outdated protective measure requiring legislative review.

Section 56 CPC creates a categorical bar: no woman can be arrested or detained in civil prison for non-payment of a money decree. This was a progressive provision in 1908 when women had little economic agency and civil arrest was a routine enforcement tool against judgment-debtors. The constitutional hook that justifies it is Article 15(3), which allows the State to make special provisions for women and children — an exception to the general prohibition on sex-based discrimination under Article 15(1).

The tension today arises from changed socio-economic reality. Women now hold property, run businesses, and are party to commercial contracts. Absolute immunity from civil arrest arguably creates a moral hazard — a solvent woman can refuse to honour a decree with no coercive remedy available to the decree-holder. Courts have wrestled with whether Article 15(3) is a shield for genuinely protective legislation or a licence for perpetuating paternalistic stereotypes.

The Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence on sex-equality — from Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association (2008), which struck down over-protective provisions that reinforce stereotypes, to Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018) — creates doctrinal pressure on Section 56. CLAT PG examiners use this topic to test whether candidates can apply constitutional doctrine to procedural law, distinguish protective from paternalistic legislation, and reason through competing rights frameworks.